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Limitations on Commissioner's Power to 
Require Accounting Changes 
BY THOMAS J . GRAVES 
Partner, Executive Office 
Presented before the New York University Nineteenth Annual 
Institute on Federal Taxation, New York — November 1960 
SINCE the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, there has 
been a marked increase in the frequency and significance of ques-
tions regarding tax accounting methods. This has been caused not so 
much by any lack of clarity in the accounting provisions of the Code, 
most of which are merely re-enactments of earlier provisions, as by the 
increased attention to several problems of longstanding that resulted 
from discussion and consideration of the few tax accounting rules that 
were new in the Code. 
The statutory recognition given to prepaid income and estimated 
expenses in 19541 caused many taxpayers to find tax-saving improve-
ments and corrections in their accounting, some of which seemed 
usable even after the new rules were repealed. The Treasury's dis-
satisfaction with these new rules and with those of section 481, which 
was enacted to provide an orderly and reasonable basis for dealing 
with adjustments resulting from accounting-method changes, forced 
its staff into greater awareness of tax-accounting concepts. As a 
result, both tax practitioners and the Internal Revenue Service are 
more sophisticated in these matters today than they were in 1954. 
This greater awareness has led to a better understanding of the 
advantages to be gained from correction and changing accounting 
methods. Taxpayers have been interested primarily in revisions that 
would tend to reduce their tax liabilities, such as corrections of their 
treatment of accruable liabilities deducted erroneously on a cash basis 
in earlier years. There are many instances, however, where tax treat-
ments already in use are sufficiently advantageous to taxpayers and 
sufficiently subject to attack by the Internal Revenue Service that 
taxpayers and their advisers should be aware of the defenses they may 
raise against attempts by the Service to force unwanted changes. A 
typical and fairly common example is the reduction in taxable income 
that has resulted where inventories have been valued consistently 
over a period of years under a method resulting in inventory costs 
lower than those that might be determined under any valuation 
1 IRC sections 452 and 462, repealed by PL 74, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955). 
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method acceptable to the Commissioner, such as where the taxpayer 
has been using direct costing or has been valuing inventories only on 
the basis of their material content. 
BASIS OF COMMISSIONER'S POWER 
In considering the basis for the power of the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue to require accounting changes, and the limitations 
on that power, it is important to distinguish between a change of 
accounting method and the correction of an error in the application of 
an accounting method. The power of the Commissioner to require 
correction of errors is not stated specifically in the Code. It is implicit 
in his general administrative powers. Since an error is merely a devia-
tion from correctness or accuracy, the only real limitation of the 
Commissioner's power to require correctness lies in the repose brought 
by the passage of time and the application of the statute of limitations. 
On the other hand, if it can be demonstrated that a proposed change is 
a change of accounting method, there are a number of limitations on 
the Commissioner's power. It is these limitations that are the subject 
of this discussion. 
The source of the Commissioner's power is the provision of the 
Code permitting him to require the use of a method of accounting that 
clearly reflects income if the method already in use does not have that 
result or if no method of accounting has been regularly used.2 
Since the taxpayer is required to compute his taxable income 
under the method of accounting on the basis of which he keeps his 
books,3 the Commissioner would seem also to have the power to re-
quire a conforming change where the tax accounting and the book 
accounting are not the same. This power is so limited by other more 
important considerations, however, that it is significant principally to 
a new taxpayer who has not yet had time to establish a pattern of con-
sistent use for tax purposes of a method differing from his book 
method. The requirement of conformity also may be helpful to the 
Commissioner in a situation where he approves the book method but 
disapproves the method used in computing taxable income and uses the 
lack of conformity as an additional argument against the right to use 
the method he is challenging. 
2 IRC section 446 (b). 
3 IRC section 446 (a). 
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LIMITATIONS ON COMMISSIONER'S POWER 
Since the limitations on the Commissioner's power to require 
accounting-method changes have been developed partly in regulations 
and court decisions and partly in practice, and since their applications 
frequently are interrelated, it should be helpful to summarize them 
briefly before proceeding to a more complete explanation: 
1. The Commissioner's definition of an accounting method pro-
vides a substantial limitation because it separates the area in which he 
may make changes completely at his discretion, as in corrections of 
errors, from the area in which he must meet certain tests before his 
attempts to force changes will be sustained, as in changes of methods. 
2. Since section 481 provides relief from some of the changes that 
might be forced by the Commissioner, it results in a practical limita-
tion where the Commissioner is unwilling to take a step that would 
result in relief he would prefer not to grant. 
3. Unless the Commissioner can demonstrate that the method 
he seeks to change does not reflect income clearly, he has substantially 
no basis on which to proceed. 
4. Consistency in the use of an accounting method and its prior 
acceptance by the Commissioner may be sufficient to overcome a lack 
of theoretical correctness. 
5. The power to require conformity of tax accounting with dif-
ferent book accounting frequently is an impotent weapon because 
conformity may be inconsistent with the more important tests of 
consistency, prior acceptance, and clear reflection of income. 
6. The clear reflection of income is so important that where a 
taxpayer has corrected an error in the application of an accounting 
method, the Commissioner may not be able to force a return to the 
erroneous treatment, even though he did not give permission for the 
change. 
7. Conformity with industry practice presents another serious 
obstacle to the Commissioner. 
8. The Commissioner's powers are limited also by the implica-
tions of the carryover rules of sections 381(c)(4) and (5). 
Although this list of limitations is an imposing one, its presenta-
tion tends to be misleading if it is not accompanied by a warning. It 
frequently is difficult to overcome the Commissioner's discretionary 
powers in this area. It is important to bear in mind also that there 
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have been inconsistencies among the various courts in their applica-
tion of the rules having to do with accounting-method changes. A l -
though they apply the same basic principles, their understanding of 
what these principles may imply in a given case varies considerably. 
As a result there undoubtedly will be a great deal of additional litiga-
tion within the next few years on many of these limitations. 
DEFINITION OF A N ACCOUNTING METHOD 
Since the Commissioner's power to accept or reject taxpayer 
changes in accounting is limited to those changes where there are 
changes in accounting methods, it is not surprising that the definition 
of an accounting method in the regulations is very broad. The term 
"method of accounting" is defined as including not only the over-all 
method of accounting of the taxpayer but also the accounting treat-
ment of any item.4 
Despite this basic definition, in presenting the requirement that 
there should be no change of accounting method without permission 
and in discussing the applicability of section 481 to adjustments 
resulting from changes in accounting methods, the regulations limit 
the definition for those special purposes by stating that a change in 
method includes a change in the treatment of a material item. It is 
clearly within the Commissioner's power to introduce the concept of 
materiality to limit the changes that will require his permission, but 
it is doubtful that the applicability of section 481 can be limited in 
this way without a change in the basic definition of an accounting 
method.5 
Actually the inconsistency is more apparent than real. In prac-
tice, where the taxpayer proposes to change an item of any conse-
quence and where the change would be to his advantage, the Service 
has tended to refuse permission even though the item is one that 
does not come within the ordinary understanding of materiality. This 
is evident in the attitude of the Service toward corrections of the 
treatment of accruable real estate taxes and accruable vacation pay 
4 Reg. section 1.446-1 (a) (1). 
5 The failure of the basic definition to recognize substantiality or materiality is not 
supported by its background in prior law and regulations, congressional intent, or 
court decisions. Section 41, IRC (1939); Reg 118 section 39.41-2(a) and (c); 
Sen Rep No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 300 (1954); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com'r, 
218 F(2d) 697 (10th Cir. 1955). Compare Advertisers Exchange, Inc., 25 TC 
1086 (1956), aff'd 280 F(2d) 958 (2d Cir. 1957). For a further discussion see 
Graves, What Constitutes a Change in Accounting Practice: The Service's 
Changing Concept, Proc. N.Y.U. 16th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation 556-558 (1958). 
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being deducted on a cash basis by taxpayers using an accrual basis 
of accounting in all other respects. Earlier revenue rulings had sug-
gested that these accounting treatments might be corrected to the 
taxpayers' benefit by application of the provisions for mitigation of 
the statute of limitations, which usually are applicable when errors 
are being corrected. However, the position of the Service was "clari-
fied" in a 1959 revenue ruling 6 which actually changed its apparent 
position and held in effect that corrections of errors such as these are 
actually changes in accounting method subject to approval. 
Three recent Tax Court decisions suggest that the Court may not 
accept this position and the related definition of an accounting method. 
The first of these decisions, that of Alta Cooperative Elevator,7 is 
particularly interesting because it illustrates so well the difference 
between the position of the Service and that of the Tax Court. In 
this case the taxpayer, who was otherwise on the accrual basis, 
changed its deduction of accruable real estate taxes in 1954 from the 
cash basis to the accrual basis and at the same time claimed a deduc-
tion for the taxes paid in that year but not deducted on the accrual 
basis in the preceding year. The Service allowed the deduction on the 
accrual basis but denied the deduction for the taxes paid. In its 
original opinion the Tax Court supported the Service but in doing so 
expressed views concerning the nonapplicability of section 481 and 
concerning the fact that the changes made were mere corrections of 
errors instead of changes in an accounting method. This language 
was so unpalatable to the Service that it filed a motion for recon-
sideration, conceded the double deduction to the taxpayer, and pre-
vailed upon the Court to withdraw the related portion of its original 
opinion. 
The position of the Tax Court that it would not glorify as an 
accounting method an error in the application of an over-all method 
in use by a taxpayer was stated again early in 1960 in the case of 
The O Liquidating Corporation.8 This related to an attempt to an ac-
crual basis taxpayer to discontinue its erroneous practice of accruing 
for expected dividends on group insurance policies in the year pre-
ceding that in which the accruals actually should have been recorded. 
In holding for the taxpayer the Court explained that there was not 
actually a change in accounting method but a correction of an erro-
6 Rev Rul 59-285 (IRB 1959-2, 458). 
7 1959 P-H TC Memo Dec par 59033, vacated and superseded by 1959 P-H TC 
Memo Dec par 59102. 
8 1960 P-H TC Memo Dec par 60029. 
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neous treatment that was inconsistent with the method of accounting 
regularly employed, the accrual method. In fact the Court was quite 
pointed in rejecting the Service position, saying, "It is not yet the 
law that wrongs, no matter how numerous, wi l l make right." 
In the most recent case, decided by the Tax Court in August, 
the Service used this same interpretation to its own advantage in 
forcing a taxpayer to include the expense of incoming freight in in-
ventory costs.9 
As a result of these developments many taxpayers are in an ad-
vantageous position in dealing with the definition of an accounting 
method. If the taxpayer seeks a relatively narrow change that is to 
his advantage, such as a change in the treatment of real estate taxes, 
he can argue with good prospect of success that the change is not 
a change in accounting method and that the Commissioner's permis-
sion is not required. On the other hand, if the accounting treatment 
in question is one that the taxpayer would like to defend, such as the 
use of the direct-costing method of inventory valuation, he should 
be able to use the definition in the regulations as his defense, thus 
forcing the Commissioner to overcome the other limitations on the 
Commissioner's power to force an accounting-method change. (The 
Court did not discuss this point in the recent case where the Com-
missioner obtained a change in the treatment of incoming freight, 
and it is not clear whether the taxpayer offered the argument as part 
of his defense.) 
PRACTICAL LIMITATION OF SECTION 481 
Where the method that the Commissioner would change was in 
effect in years prior to the effective date of the 1954 Code and where 
the adjustment that would result from the change includes a sub-
stantial amount accumulated prior to that date, he may be unwilling 
to force the change because of the cutoff provisions of section 481. 
Ordinarily when there is a change that meets the definition of a change 
in accounting method, there must be recognized in the year of the 
change those related adjustments that are necessary in order to pre-
vent amounts from being duplicated or omitted in the determination 
of taxable income. However, if the change was not initiated by the 
taxpayer, no adjustment is to be made in respect of taxable years 
prior to those to which the 1954 Code applies.10 
9 D. Loveman & Son Export Corporation, 34 TC No. 80 (1960). 
10 IRC section 481(a)(2). 
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Even though the Commissioner may be able to overcome the 
other problem involved in a forced change, if the pre-1954 accumula-
tion is large enough, he may be unwilling to take a step that would 
have the effect of changing a taxpayer's tax accounting basis but 
relieving the taxpayer of some of the burden of the related accumu-
lated income. 
It is likely that this question will arise frequently in connection 
with inventory valuation. It is not unusual to find that new busi-
nesses without adequate accounting advice, and often with justifiable 
questions as to the real values of their inventories, establish account-
ing practices of recognizing only portions of their production costs 
for inventory-valuation purposes. Where these practices are applied 
from year to year on an orderly basis, they should have the same 
status for section 481 purposes as any other accounting method the 
Commissioner might seek to change. 
The Commissioner's answer to this approach, and to the applica-
tion of the cutoff of section 481, probably will be an attempt to main-
tain that the practices in question are not actually accounting 
methods. In this attempt he wil l be at a disadvantage because his 
own regulation describes a method of accounting as including the 
accounting treatment of any item. Even the questionable attempt 
to inject a test of materiality for section 481 adjustment purposes11 
should not help him in most inventory cases because the inventory 
itself is material in practically all of them and the effect of the ques-
tioned practice usually is material also. 
The Tax Court wil l have a good opportunity to discuss this 
problem in the case of Fruehauf Trailer Company.12 In this case the 
Commissioner is trying to force the company to value its inventory 
of used trailers on the basis of the lower of cost or market even though 
he considered the question in the examination of tax returns for 
earlier years and agreed to a valuation of only one dollar per unit. 
The Commissioner seems to be contending that such a change would 
not be a change in accounting method and therefore that the section 
481 adjustment cutoff would not apply. 
CLEAR REFLECTION OF INCOME 
The most important limitation on the Commissioner lies in the 
statutory grant of his power to require a change in an established 
11 Reg section 1.481-1 (a)(1). 
12 TC Docket No. 88221. 
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accounting method if the method does not clearly reflect income.13 
If it does clearly reflect income, the Commissioner is powerless to act 
even though the method might not be one of those that he approves 
and even though it might be theoretically incorrect from an account-
ing viewpoint. 
The Commissioner's acceptance of this view of his position is 
indicated in a statement of policy with respect to depreciation adjust-
ments that he made in 1953 in an attempt to avoid unnecessary con-
troversies. In Rev. Ruls. 90 and 91, 1 4 he took the position that ad-
justments in depreciation should be proposed only where there is 
a clear and convincing basis for a change and he instructed revenue 
agents to consider reasonable tolerances in deciding whether proposed 
adjustments are substantial. 
The question of whether there is a clear reflection of income may 
not be easy to answer in a given case. There has been no attempt to 
prescribe a uniform method of tax accounting for all taxpayers. Each 
case must be considered on the basis of its facts, generally accepted 
accounting principles, applicable trade practices, the tax accounting 
rules of the regulations, and the varied views of the courts, as to the 
weight and interpretation to be given these factors. Some definite 
trends are discernible, but there has not yet evolved a set of clear 
rules for the determination of just when income is clearly reflected. 
However, there are several valid generalizations available for the 
guidance of taxpayers faced with the problem. 
Although the Treasury Department accepts the theory that recog-
nition should be given to generally accepted accounting principles 
and to established trade and business practices,15 many of the posi-
tions taken by the Treasury ignore this principle. In general, the 
Treasury can be expected to favor a position that avoids any deferral 
of income and any acceleration of deductions, without regard to the 
impact of what might be regarded as correct accounting theory. Thus, 
in considering when income is reportable by an accrual-basis taxpayer, 
the Treasury tries to avoid the question of whether the income has 
actually been earned, and requires that it be reported "when all the 
events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and 
the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy." 1 6 
13 See note 2. 
14 IRB 1953-1, 43 and 44. 
15 Reg section 1.446-1 (a) (2). 
16 Reg section 1.451-1 (a). 
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The Tax Court frequently is sympathetic with this revenue-
oriented approach to tax accounting, but the Circuit Courts have been 
moving in the direction of generally accepted accounting principles. 
In the most recent case, Schlude vs. Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit 
refused to accept the Tax Court's application of the "claim of right" 
theory and held that a dance studio was clearly reflecting its income 
from dance instructions when it deferred that income until it had 
actually been earned.17 A number of other Circuits have moved toward 
accepted accounting principles in reversing decisions of the Tax 
Court. 1 8 These are all 1939 Code cases but they seem to be equally 
applicable under the 1954 Code despite conflicting provisions of the 
present regulations, which presumably would be held to be invalid. 
The concept of the clear reflection of income includes not only 
a question of the propriety of the accounting method used but also 
the question of the significance of a proposed change. A court may 
give little weight to a failure to reflect income most clearly when the 
distortion is not significant.19 In this connection, it may be more 
difficult for the Commissioner to force a change if there is no sig-
nificant distortion in the years under review even though a substan-
tial error might have accumulated in prior years.20 
CONSISTENCY AND PRIOR ACCEPTANCE 
Most of the decided cases dealing with accounting-method changes 
involve consideration of not just one but several of the limitations on 
the Commissioner's power to force action. When the Commissioner 
cannot demonstrate that there has been a failure to reflect income 
clearly or when the court is not convinced that the failure is sufficiently 
substantial to require a change, the taxpayer should be able to resist 
the change successfully if he can show that he has used the ques-
tioned method consistently in the past and that its use in connection 
with earlier returns has been accepted by the Commissioner. 
The importance of consistency is specifically recognized in the 
regulations.21 In fact, in connection with inventories the Treasury 
takes the position that, within the general limits of the regulations, 
17 AFTR 2d 5683 (8th Cir. 1960). 
18 Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Com'r, 267 F(2d) 523 (2nd Cir. 1959); Schuessler v. 
Com'r, 230 F(2d) 722 (5th Cir. 1955); Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Com'r, 219 
F(2d) 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com'r, supra note 5. 
19 Glenn v. Kentucky Color & Chemical Co., Inc., 186 F(2d) 975 (6th Cir. 1951). 
20 For a case like this in which the Commissioner conceded, see Milwaukee Valve 
Company, 1958 P-H TC Memo par 58164. 
2 1 Reg sections 1.446-1 (a) (2) and 1.167(b)-o(a). 
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"greater weight is to be given to consistency than to any particular 
method of the inventorying or basis of valuation . . . " . 2 2 
The courts have recognized that consistency is more important 
than theoretical correctness when the accompanying distortion of 
income is not sufficient to cause them to conclude that income was 
not clearly reflected. A good example of this is the Geometric Stamp-
ing Company case23 in which the taxpayer was permitted to continue 
the use for tax purposes of the direct-costing method of valuing in-
ventories even though there would have been an inventory adjustment 
of $35,000 if the Commissioner had been upheld in his attempt to 
force the change. The Court was particularly impressed by prior 
consistent use and by the fact that the Commissioner had specifically 
considered and accepted the method in connection with earlier exami-
nations. 
There should be no question whether there was prior acceptance 
of a method by the Commissioner where it was adopted in an earlier 
year at his request, where it was the subject of an earlier revenue 
agent's report for a year in which it was accepted in final settlement, 
or even where it can be shown that a revenue agent specifically ques-
tioned and discussed it but without making it a point of issue in his 
report.24 In fact, the Commissioner has been held to have impliedly 
given his consent to a change where he accepted on a changed basis 
returns containing information indicating, but not specifically stating, 
that a change had been made.25 
ACCOUNTING CONFORMITY 
The requirement that taxable income should be computed under 
the accounting method used by the taxpayer in keeping his books often 
is in direct conflict with the tests of clear reflection, consistency, and 
prior acceptance by the Commissioner. It is well recognized in the 
law and in actual practice that there will be differences between the 
tax and book acccounting methods. The Code specifically states that 
when a taxpayer changes the method of accounting used in keeping 
his books, he may not compute his taxable income under the new 
method without obtaining the approval of the Commissioner.26 In 
22 Reg section 1.471-2(b). 
23 26 TC 301 (1956) acq. as to result. Also see Kentucky Color & Chemical Co., 
supra note 18, and Milwaukee Valve Company, supra note 19. 
24 S. Rossin & Sons, Inc. v. Com'r, 113 F(2d) 774 (2nd Cir. 1940). 
25 Fowler Bros. v. Com'r, 138 F(2d) 774 (6th Cir. 1943): Tampa Tribune Publish-
ing Co., 52 AFTR 1799 (DC Fla 1957). 
26 IRC section 446(e). 
226 
fact, there are so many differences between book and tax accounting 
that the Corporate Income Tax Return, Form 1120, has for many 
years included a special schedule for the reconciliation of taxable 
income and analysis of earned surplus. 
Although the Commissioner may occasionally use the require-
ment of conformity as an added argument in attempting to obtain a 
change, the principal impact of the conformity rule is on relatively 
new taxpayers that have not yet established the consistent use of 
accounting methods that clearly reflect income. When income is 
clearly reflected and when the Courts are faced with the choice 
between consistency and conformity, they have rejected conformity 
in favor of consistency.27 
It should not be assumed, however, that the ability of a taxpayer 
to maintain an established tax-accounting method permits him to 
make changes in his book accounting without any consideration of the 
tax consequences. Sometimes a change on the books can be a demon-
stration of his view on the realization of income or on the presence 
of value that might otherwise be subject to question. 
Of particular importance is the possible effect of a book change 
in a situation where a similar change made for tax purposes would be 
the subject of a section 481 adjustment that would mean the possible 
applicability of the pre-1954 cutoff. Where the taxpayer initiates a 
change to which section 481 applies, the cutoff is denied him. There 
seems to be no basis in the law for suggesting that where the tax 
accounting and the book accounting conform and a change is made 
for book-accounting purposes only, there is an initiation of a change 
for tax purposes also. However, it would not be surprising to find 
the Commissioner taking that position where the continuing tax-ac-
counting method is less acceptable to him than the new changed 
method used on the books or where the existing tax-accounting 
method does not clearly reflect income. If in these circumstances the 
Commissioner should proceed with an attempt to force a conforming 
change in the tax accounting, he might contend that he was merely 
carrying through to its logical conclusion a change initiated by the 
taxpayer in changing his book accounting, and that the section 481 
cutoff should be denied. Unti l this point has been clarified, care should 
be exercised in making changes in the books that would create this 
possibility for action by the Commissioner. 
27 Patchen v. Com'r, 258 F(2d) 544 (5th Cir. 1958); R. G. Bent, 26 BTA 1369 
(1932) acq.; National Airlines, Inc., 9 TC 159 (1947). 
227 
CONSISTENCY OF ERRONEOUS TREATMENT 
Although the test of consistency is second in importance only to 
that of the clear reflection of income, the Commissioner probably will 
be unable to use it to force a taxpayer to return to an erroneous ac-
counting treatment where the taxpayer has corrected an error in the 
application of an established accounting method. A good example of 
this point occurred in connection with the Crosley Corporation's 
handling of its tooling expenses in 1939, 1940, and 1941.28 In 1939 
Crosley, an accrual-basis taxpayer, incurred substantial tooling ex-
penses in connection with the manufacture of a new automobile. 
Following the practice that it had established in earlier years for 
deducting similar expenses in connection with the manufacture of 
radios and refrigerators, it took all of the automobile tooling expenses 
as a deduction in 1939. In 1946, mindful of the advantages of shifting 
the deduction from 1939 to 1941 and of the resulting increase in its 
excess profits credit, it filed a claim for refund for the year 1941 claim-
ing that the deduction in 1939 should have been spread over the years 
1939, 1940, and 1941. In allowing the claim the Court viewed the 
adjustment as the correction of an error and disregarded the Govern-
ment's contention that the company had been following its usual 
method of accounting. Of course, cases such as this one should be 
distinguished from those where a change of accounting method is 
actually involved. 2 9 
INDUSTRY PRACTICE 
Ordinarily industry accounting practices are not controlling. For 
example, it has been held that accounting methods forced upon a 
taxpayer by a regulatory body are not binding on the Commissioner.30 
However, when conformity with industry practice can be added to 
other factors favorable to the taxpayer, it presents another formidable 
obstacle to the Commissioner if he is trying to force a change.31 
28 Crosley Corp. v. U.S., 229 F(2d) 376 (6th Cir. 1956). Also see Beacon Publishing 
Co., supra note 5; O Liquidating Corporation, supra note 8; Scofield v. Lewis, 
251 F(2d) 128 (5th Cir. 1958). 
29 Advertisers Exchange, Inc., supra note 5; United States Industrial Alcohol Co. 
v. Helvering, 137 F(2d) 511 (2nd Cir. 1943); Michael Drazen, 34 TC No. 109 
(1960). 
30 Barretville Bank & Trust Company, 1958 P-H TC Memo Dec par 58148; Old 
Colony R.R. Co. v. Com'r, 284 US 522 (1932). 
31 Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Com'r, supra note 17. 
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CARRYOVER OF ACCOUNTING ATTRIBUTES 
The Commissioner's power to require accounting-method changes 
in connection with corporate reorganizations and liquidations is lim-
ited by the requirements of Code sections 381(c) (4) and (5) for the 
carryover of accounting attributes in corporate changes to which 
section 381 applies. In general, the acquiring corporation is required 
to use the accounting and inventory methods of the transferor cor-
poration unless there is a conflict among the methods used, in which 
event appropriate regulations are to be prescribed to resolve the con-
flict. Proposed regulations have not yet been issued, but it seems clear 
that it was the intent of Congress to provide for the carryover of exist-
ing accounting and depreciation methods wherever practicable. Even 
if the acquiring and transferor corporations were using different 
methods, the implications of the congressional enactment of the carry-
over rules would seem to be that the different methods should be 
continued if the business activities and records of the acquired and 
acquiring organizations can be maintained separately and if each 
method clearly reflects income. 
It is not clear that the adjustment rules of section 481 should 
apply if the Commissioner chooses between the accounting and in-
ventory methods of the acquiring and acquired businesses because 
separability of their activities and records cannot be maintained. 
Since his power to choose flows from section 381, there may be a 
question concerning whether section 481 should apply, as it would 
if there were a change of accounting method under the provisions of 
section 446. On the other hand, if the Commissioner forces a change 
because the methods to be carried over do not clearly reflect income 
and not because they cannot be maintained separately, the change 
would seem to be one to which sections 446 and 481 would apply. 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONSIDERATIONS 
Although this discussion of the Commissioner's power to require 
accounting changes has been directed entirely to the tax-accounting 
problems that must be faced, it should be remembered that consider-
ation should be given to generally accepted accounting principles if 
financial reports are to be made to creditors, stockholders, and the 
public. Conflicts may arise if the method of accounting used in the 
books and for tax reporting is not acceptable for financial reporting. 
Where a change made in the books would endanger the continued use 
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of an advantageous method for tax purposes, financial reporting stand-
ards will be met in most cases if a change is made in the financial 
statements only and if there is an explanation in the accountant's 
report of the differences between the financial statements and the 
books. 
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